On October 17th, 2011, Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker reported for the New York Times on how the Obama administration debated whether to use a cyberoffensive to disrupt and disable Libyan air-defenses before the American-led strikes against the Quaddafi government. The goal of this cyberoffensive was to sever military communication links, thus preventing early-warning radars from relaying the location of NATO warplanes to missle batteries. However, the attack was abandoned because the Obama administration was worried that it could create precedent for other nations (like Russia or China) to carry out cyberraids of their own. Further, administration officials were unsure whether the President had the power to proceed without informing Congress.
The article went on to consider how cyberweapons have grown as a form of warfare. James Andrew Lewis, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted that the United States doesn't "want to be the ones who break the glass on this new kind of warfare.” This same debate was repeated when military planners suggested a computer-network attack to conceal Navy Seal commandos from radar during the Osama bin Laden raid. This debate resulted in another no. One administration official said “These cybercapabilities are still like the Ferrari that you keep in the garage and only take out for the big race and not just for a run around town, unless nothing else can get you there.”
Of course, no one is certain whether cyberattacks on foreign countries might create legal restrictions on war-making by the executive branch without Congressional permission. It remains uncertain whether the War Powers Resolution would require the executive to formally notfy lawmakers when it plans to use a cyberattack.
The source article can be found here.
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