I was sitting on the couch and I suddenly remembered a particularly interesting peice of Gen. Hayden's speech from yesterday (see this blog post, or just look below, for further context).  I was going to update my earlier blog post, but I wanted to make sure this point got its proper attention.

Someone asked Gen. Hayden about what happens when the "facts guys" (i.e. intel agencies) allow their cynical view of the world to impact how they present the facts to the "vision guy" (i.e. the president, or policy-makers).  The question lead to a discussion of the intelligence behind the Iraq War and Saddam's WMDs.  Of course, there didn't end up being any WMDs.

Gen. Hayden explained that although the intelligence behind the Iraq NIE was wrong, the intel agencies genuinely believed in its veracity.  The problem was the NIE's use of absolute language.  The General explained how, on a scale of 1 to 10, intelligence agencies can never really get above an 8 on how confident they are that something will happen.  Thus, the use of that absolute language in the NIE was a problem.  

However, the General stressed that the U.S. intel community really has learned its lesson.  The NIE considering Iran's nuclear ambitions was rife with qualifiers. 

Moreover, the General explained how President Bush actually turned down an attack on a Syrian nuclear reactor.  The Israelis ended up destroying that reactor, and in the process, they may have used a cyberattack to help disable the Syrian air defenses.  Anywho, Gen. Hayden told President Bush three things: we know the Syrians have a nuclear reactor, we know the N. Koreans built it, and we know its probably being used for a weapons program (the reactor was out in the desert, suggesting that it had no domestic purpose).  However, Gen. Hayden said that we didn't have any hard evidence the Syrians were using it for a weapons program.  How did President Bush respond?  He declined to attack, citing that lack of evidence.

Pres. Bush recounted that story in his memoir, Decision Points.

What's the point?  The General argued (and I agree) that the U.S. intelligence community learned its lesson behind Iraq, and more importantly, it has applied that lesson.

I was sitting on the couch and I suddenly remembered a particularly interesting peice of Gen. Hayden's speech from yesterday (see this blog post, or just look below, for further context).  I was going to update my earlier blog post, but I wanted to make sure this point got its proper attention.

Someone asked Gen. Hayden about what happens when the "facts guys" (i.e. intel agencies) allow their cynical view of the world to impact how they present the facts to the "vision guy" (i.e. the president, or policy-makers).  The question lead to a discussion of the intelligence behind the Iraq War and Saddam's WMDs.  Of course, there didn't end up being any WMDs.

Gen. Hayden explained that although the intelligence behind the Iraq NIE was wrong, the intel agencies genuinely believed in its veracity.  The problem was the NIE's use of absolute language.  The General explained how, on a scale of 1 to 10, intelligence agencies can never really get above an 8 on how confident they are that something will happen.  Thus, the use of that absolute language in the NIE was a problem.  

However, the General stressed that the U.S. intel community really has learned its lesson.  The NIE considering Iran's nuclear ambitions was rife with qualifiers. 

Moreover, the General explained how President Bush actually turned down an attack on a Syrian nuclear reactor.  The Israelis ended up destroying that reactor, and in the process, they may have used a cyberattack to help disable the Syrian air defenses.  Anywho, Gen. Hayden told President Bush three things: we know the Syrians have a nuclear reactor, we know the N. Koreans built it, and we know its probably being used for a weapons program (the reactor was out in the desert, suggesting that it had no domestic purpose).  However, Gen. Hayden said that we didn't have any hard evidence the Syrians were using it for a weapons program.  How did President Bush respond?  He declined to attack, citing that lack of evidence.

Pres. Bush recounted that story in his memoir, Decision Points.

What's the point?  The General argued (and I agree) that the U.S. intelligence community learned its lesson behind Iraq, and more importantly, it has applied that lesson.