Each Agency has 90 days to provide a risk management report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the OMB.
DHS, OMB, Commerce, General Services and the White House staff then have 60 days to submit to the President a plan to protect the “executive branch enterprise.” Is that coordination or an ability to designate who is in charge?
For any national security system, the SecDEF and DNI replace DHS and OMB.
An even larger group has 180 days to provide a report on protecting critical infrastructure.
That group includes Secretary of DHS, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the DNI, the Director of the FBI, “the heads of appropriate sector-specific agencies, … and all other appropriate agency heads.”
The order calls for “market transparency of cybersecurity risk management practices by critical infrastructure entities,” presumably so people can vote with their feet. But, much critical infrastructure is either regulated monopolies or in the public sector. So, consumer choice is minimal and demand will not be elastic based upon transparency of poor cybersecurity practices. So, this may simply amount to public shaming as the enforcement mechanism.
A different large group of public agencies is to promote resilience against botnets and the like.
Energy, DHS, and ODNI have 90 days to report on securing the electric grid.
For the nation in general, “it is the policy of the executive branch to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, and economic prosperity, while respecting privacy and guarding against disruption, fraud, and theft.” Note that one side of the balance is only “disruption, fraud, and theft.” There is no mention there of preventing terrorist communications or contraband such as child pornography.”
A report on deterring adversaries is required within 90 days.
A section entitled “International Cooperation” also calls for reports but gives no indication of whether the Administration still supports multi-stakeholderism or will shift to multi-literalism.
For better or worse, the order does not address investigative abilities and criminal enforcement.
The order takes a defense posture and does not promote, yet, offensive cybersecurity.
Leave a Reply